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Comcast Corp. v. Behrend,1 the Supreme Court’s recent deci-
sion on antitrust class certification, is widely perceived as having 
made class certification more difficult.  Antitrust plaintiff classes 
must demonstrate, at the certification stage, that class-wide damages 
are measurable with a “common methodology” consistent with the 
Court’s “rigorous analysis” standard,2 under both Federal Rule 23(b) 
as well 23(a).3  Strong dissents were filed in both the Third Circuit 
and the Court amid sharp disagreements about what the multiple re-
gression model at issue actually entailed for purposes of antitrust im-
pact damage measurement.4  Part I discusses the Comcast majority 
and dissent positions as well as the decision in the district court5 and 
conflicting views of the majority and dissent in the Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit.6  Part II discusses the multiple regression model 
at the center of Comcast, the Court’s understanding of it and how and 
why judges expressed conflicting views as to its methodology and 
merits.  The authors provide advice for consideration by counsel and 
expert alike in preparing or attacking statistical expert reports, includ-
ing multiple regression damage models, under the “rigorous analysis” 
standard as elucidated by Comcast.7 
 
1 133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013). 
2 See generally the test set forth in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551-
52 (2011).  A “rigorous analysis,” as applied by the Third Circuit, “requires a thorough ex-
amination of the factual and legal allegations and may include a preliminary inquiry into the 
merits.”  See Behrend v. Comcast Corp., 655 F.3d 182, 190 (3d. Cir. 2011) (internal quota-
tions omitted) (stating Rule 23 requirements “are not mere pleading rules.  The court may 
delve beyond the pleadings to determine whether the requirements for class certification are 
satisfied [, and that a]n overlap between class certification requirement and the merits of a 
claim is no reason to decline to resolve relevant disputes when necessary to determine 
whether a class certification requirement is met”). 
3 Federal Rules 23(a)(2) and (3) provide that one or more members of a class may sue or 
be sued as representative parties on behalf of all members only if there are questions of law 
or fact common to the class and the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typi-
cal of the claims or defenses of the class.  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2)-(3).  Federal Rule 23(b)(3) 
provides that a class action may be maintained if Rule 23(a) is satisfied and the court finds 
“the questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions af-
fecting only individual members.”  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).  Plaintiff’s burden at the certifi-
cation stage is not to prove antitrust impact on the merits but to demonstrate such impact is 
capable of being proved at trial through evidence common to the class rather than individual 
class members; for that reason, the Third Circuit concluded the dispute between Comcast 
and plaintiffs was “evidentiary.”  Behrend, 655 F.3d at 197. 
4 Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1435 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Behrend, 655 F.3d at 208 (Jor-
dan, J., dissenting). 
5 Behrend v. Comcast Corp., 264 F.R.D. 150 (E.D. Pa. 2010). 
6 Behrend, 655 F.3d 182. 
7 See id. at 190 (clarifying the “rigorous analysis” standard).  The district court heard live 
2
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PART I 
A. Justice Scalia and the Majority Position 
The Comcast plaintiffs were subscribers of Comcast Corpora-
tion, a television cable company they sued for, inter alia, monopoli-
zation under the Sherman Act, Section 2.8  Comcast allegedly used an 
anticompetitive strategy that drove prices up for “non-basic video 
programming cable service”9 in Philadelphia’s media market (the 
“Philadelphia DMA”).10  Plaintiffs sought to certify a Rule 23(b)(3) 
class11 for persons in the Philadelphia DMA injured by Comcast’s al-
leged anti-competitive misconduct during the class period.12  The 
District Court required plaintiffs to satisfy the predominance element 
by proving that the existence of individual injury resulting from the 
alleged antitrust violation(s) could be proven with evidence common 
to the class and, as well, that class damages were measurable, on a 
class-wide basis, using a “common methodology.”13 
Comcast had used a so-called “clustering strategy” which, the 
class alleged, raised cable subscription rates in an area referred to as 
the Philadelphia DMA.14  “Clustering” is effected by concentrating 
operations within a particular region,15 and Comcast allegedly en-
gaged in clustering by acquiring competitor cable providers in the 
DMA by swapping their systems outside the region for competitor 
 
testimony from fact and expert witnesses and considered thirty-two expert reports, as well as 
examining deposition excerpts.  Id. at 188.  It also issued the parties a series of questions re-
lated to antitrust impact and damages methodology and then heard oral argument.  Id. 
8 Behrend, 655 F.3d at 186. 
9 Id. at 187. 
10 Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1430.  The geographical area in issue was referred to throughout 
the Comcast opinions as the Philadelphia Designated Market Area or “Philadelphia DMA.”  
Id.  The “DMA” is a media research area used to identify television stations whose broadcast 
signals reach a specific area and attract the most viewers; DMA boundaries are widely ac-
cepted and companies use them to keep track of advertising.  Id. at 1430 n.1; Behrend, 655 
F.3d at 186-87. 
11 Behrend, 655 F.3d at 187.  Plaintiffs also alleged violations of the Sherman Act, Section 
1, for monopolization or attempted monopolization, for “imposing horizontal territory, mar-
ket and customer allocations by conspiring with and entering into and implementing unlaw-
ful swap agreements, arrangements or devices.”  Id. at 186; 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2004). 
12 See Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1430 (describing the class). 
13 Id. 
14 Id. at 1430-31. 
15 See Behrend, 655 F.3d at 187 (discussing the practice of clustering); see also Behrend, 
264 F.R.D. at 161-62 (discussing how clustering allowed Comcast to gain market power). 
3
Steckman et al.: Modular Theories of Damage Causation
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2014
130 TOURO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30 
systems in the region.16  As a result of nine “clustering transactions,” 
Plaintiffs alleged that Comcast’s share of subscribers was improperly 
“increased from 23.9 percent in 1998 to 69.5 percent in 2007.”17 
Plaintiffs argued that their damages could be assessed, on a 
class-wide basis, based on an expert report authored by Dr. James 
McClave (“McClave”) (the “McClave Report”), which employed an 
econometric multiple regression model to measure the combined ef-
fect of four antitrust impacts on cable subscription prices.18  These 
four impacts included 1) decreased penetration by satellite provid-
ers,19 2) overbuilder deterrence,20 3) lack of benchmark competition,21 
and 4) increased bargaining power.22  By comparing actual cable 
prices in the region allegedly affected by anti-competitive activities 
 
16 Behrend, 655 F.3d at 187. 
17 Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1430.  See Behrend, 264 F.R.D. at 160 (discussing barriers to 
entry and market share issues). 
18 Behrend, 264 F.R.D. at 181-82.  Behrend, 655 F.3d at 191 (the phrase “antitrust im-
pact” refers to “individual injury” and is critical to the evaluation of “Rule 23(b)(3)’s pre-
dominance requirement” because “it is an element of the claim that may call for individual, 
as opposed to common, proof,” noting it is plaintiff’s burden, at the certification stage, to 
demonstrate that “antitrust impact is capable of proof at trial through evidence [] common to 
the class rather than individual [] members”). 
19 Behrend, 655 F.3d at 190 n.6.  This theory posited that Comcast’s high market share 
that resulted from clustering made it profitable for Comcast to deny Comcast SportsNet to 
direct broadcast satellite (“DBS”) providers, which lowered DBS penetration rates, which 
allowed Comcast to raise prices.  Id.  The District Court rejected this theory because it found 
that denial of SportsNet to DBS providers was unrelated to clustering.  Id. at 210 n.7.  See 
Behrend, 264 F.R.D. at 165-66 (explaining in detail why the District Court rejected the theo-
ry that clustering reduced DBS penetration in allegedly affected market). 
20 Behrend, 264 F.R.D. at 166-67 (an “overbuilder” is a company that builds and offers 
customers a competitive alternative where a telecommunications company already operates, 
and Plaintiffs’ theory was that clustering deterred overbuilders from entering the Philadelph-
ia DMA, restricting competition, allowing Comcast to raise prices).  The District Court lim-
ited Plaintiffs’ theory of antitrust impact to its alleged anticompetitive clustering conduct.  
Behrend, 655 F.3d at 195.  See id. at 210 n.6 (Jordan, J., dissenting) (discussing different 
theories); see also Behrend, 264 F.R.D. at 167-75 (discussing overbuilding theory and proof 
issues at trial). 
21 See Behrend, 264 F.R.D. at 177-78 (rejecting theory that clustering reduced benchmark 
competition, i.e., the ability of customers to compare service and prices among competing 
providers, because the plaintiffs provided no evidence that consumers actually engaged in 
benchmark competition); see also Behrend, 655 F.3d at 210 n.6 (Jordan, J., dissenting) (dis-
cussing all theories); see also Behrend, 264 F.R.D. at 175-78 (discussing and rejecting 
benchmark theory). 
22 See Behrend, 264 F.R.D. at 159 (discussing theory); see also id. at 181 (rejecting theory 
of increased bargaining power, i.e., that Comcast’s market power increased its bargaining 
power relative to content providers, allowing it to raise prices for its services, as “wholly un-
supported”); see also id. at 178-81 (discussing and rejecting increased bargaining power the-
ory). 
4
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with hypothetical prices in an unaffected region, the “McClave Re-
port” purported to measure damages resulting from the four antitrust 
impacts.23 
McClave’s methodology was extensively discussed by the 
District Court.24  The Third Circuit, in affirming the District Court, 
held the clustering evidence demonstrated that Comcast’s conduct 
plausibly could have reduced competition by raising barriers to mar-
ket entry by an overbuilder, resulting in higher prices to subscribers 
in the relevant DMA.25  For that reason, both courts held that the anti-
trust impact plaintiffs alleged was both “plausible in theory” and 
“susceptible to proof at trial through available evidence common to 
the class.”26 
Both courts further held the McClave Report’s regression 
model set out a common methodology which could measure and 
quantify damages27 on a class-wide basis,28 but rejected Comcast’s 
arguments against the Report, which, as discussed below, they per-
ceived would compel the court to decide the merits as to whether 
plaintiff proved an antitrust impact, at the certification stage.29 
The problem Justice Scalia perceived, however, was that the 
District Court had accepted only one of four theories of liability that 
the McClave model was measuring.  Scalia agreed that overbuilding, 
by which a company provides more infrastructure than demand sup-
ports, can keep competitors out,30 but disagreed with the lower courts 
 
23 Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1433-34. 
24 See generally Behrend, 264 F.R.D. at 181-91. 
25 Behrend, 655 F.3d at 198. 
26 Id. (quoting Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 325 (3d Cir. 2008)).  
Judge Jordan, dissenting, urged that even if the evidence in support of a theory was “plausi-
ble,” the question remained “whether that plausible theory is susceptible to common proof” 
and if the only proof was inadmissible expert testimony, as he maintained was the case in 
Comcast, plaintiffs will not have met their burden.  Behrend, 655 F.3d at 215 n.18 (Jordan, 
J., dissenting). 
27 Behrend, 655 F.3d at 207 (citing Behrend, 264 F.R.D. at 191). 
28 Behrend, 655 F.3d at 200-01 (“[The] antitrust impact was class-wide, because the prices 
were elevated above competitive levels across all class members and for the entire time peri-
od;” as to method, McClave compared prices Comcast charged in the Philadelphia DMA to 
benchmark counties, applying “screens to determine whether the counties represented a level 
of competition similar to what Comcast would have faced in the Philadelphia market absent 
its alleged anticompetitive conduct,” using a multiple regression analysis).  For more infor-
mation on the screens McClave used and Comcast’s experts’ criticisms of them, see general-
ly id. at 201-02.  Screens are further discussed, infra in Part II. 
29 Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1433. 
30 Id. at 1434; Behrend, 655 F.3d at 201-02, 213 (describing theories). 
5
Steckman et al.: Modular Theories of Damage Causation
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2014
132 TOURO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30 
that damages could be determined in a manner common to all class 
members.31  In his view, Plaintiffs had neither provided class-wide 
evidence that the only remaining theory, overbuilding, actually led to 
the price increases in issue nor shown damages could be calculated 
on a class-wide basis, from it.32  To the contrary, he accepted the ar-
guments Comcast made in the lower courts, but which both courts re-
jected, concluding that because plaintiffs’ model was measuring 
damages from four antitrust impact theories, rather than the single al-
lowed overbuilding theory, and because the overbuilding theory did 
not differentiate/disaggregate effects to determine which were proxi-
mately traceable to which antitrust impact, plaintiffs failed to meet 
their burden.33 
The District Court and Third Circuit rejected Comcast’s ar-
gument that plaintiff was required to show, at the certification stage, 
that its theory of damages would measure all and only the antitrust 
injury in issue, because doing so, they reasoned, would require courts 
to engage in an improper merits inquiry of plaintiffs’ damage calcula-
tion methodology, converting certification hearings to mini-trials on 
the merits.34  In their view, plaintiffs were not, at such early stage, re-
quired to “tie each theory of antitrust impact” causally to an exact 
calculation of damages,35 and they perceived that delving into a par-
ticularized damage inquiry would entail an impermissible merits in-
quiry.36 
Although the lower courts had concluded Plaintiffs’ report 
was sufficient to serve as class-wide proof at the certification stage, 
Justice Scalia began his analysis by reaffirming that plaintiffs must 
affirmatively demonstrate with evidentiary proof that the class must 
satisfy Rule 23 requirements for class certification.37  A trial court’s 
duty is to undertake a “rigorous analysis” of whether plaintiffs satisfy 
Rule 23(a) certification requirements is just as applicable to Rule 
 
31 Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1433-35. 
32 Id. 
33 Id.  Judge Jordan dissented from the Third Circuit’s holding, stating his view that alt-
hough he agreed that antitrust impact could be shown through evidence common to that class 
in the Philadelphia DMA, damages could not be proven using evidence common to that en-
tire class, which he viewed as two related, but separate questions.  Behrend, 655 F.3d at 209 
(Jordan, J., dissenting). 
34 Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1433. 
35 Id. at 1431. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. at 1432. 
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23(b).38  The lower courts erred, he reasoned, because they refused to 
entertain arguments against the class damage model just because they 
would be “pertinent to the merits.”39  Applying a rigorous analysis, he 
explained, frequently entails an overlap with a merits analysis and 
considerations “enmeshed in the factual and legal issues comprising 
the plaintiff’s cause of action.”40  Plaintiffs should have been required 
to demonstrate that they could calculate class-wide damages attribut-
able to the sole antitrust impact that the District Court allowed, i.e., 
its so-called “overbuilder theory.”41 
Although damage calculations need not be exact, Justice Scal-
ia explained, plaintiffs’ “damages case must be consistent with its li-
ability case, particularly with respect to the alleged anticompetitive 
effect of the violation.”42  Justice Scalia reasoned that McClave’s 
model failed to measure damages resulting from the only antitrust in-
jury on which liability could be premised because the base-line that 
the model McClave used “assumed the validity of all four theories of 
antitrust impact [that Plaintiffs had] initially advanced,” even though 
the District Court had rejected three of the theories.43  McClave ad-
mitted his model calculated damages resulting from the alleged anti-
competitive conduct as a whole, and as structured, could not isolate 
the damage measure attributable to the sole surviving theory without 
attributing damages to any particular theory of impact.44 
Comcast pointed out in each court that McClave had himself 
stated his model was based on the cumulative effect of the antitrust 
impacts and could not isolate damages for individual theories of 
harm.45  Because the model could not distinguish between lawful and 
unlawful competition, the District Court erred in accepting his theory 
for purposes of class certification.46  Plaintiffs responded that Com-
cast’s arguments were a premature attack on the model’s merits and 
that Comcast’s attacks on the benchmarks McClave used were a 
premature attack, as well, because the court’s role on certification 
 
38 Id. 
39 Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1432-33. 
40 Id. at 1432. 
41 Id. at 1431,1433. 
42 Id. at 1433 (quoting ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, PROVING ANTITRUST DAMAGES: 
LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ISSUES 62 (2d ed. 2010)).   
43 Id. at 1434. 
44 Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1431. 
45 Id. 
46 See Behrend, 655 F.3d at 206 (accepting McClave’s theory for class certification). 
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was simply to determine if impact could be assessed by the common, 
class-wide proof, not to determine whether a conceivable attack on 
the merit of the evidence that would ultimately be adduced in favor of 
plaintiffs’ position at trial would succeed.47 
The Third Circuit separating, as it said, the “forest [from] the 
trees,” explained its view:  
The inquiry for a district court at the class certification 
stage is whether the plaintiffs have demonstrated by a 
preponderance of the evidence that they will be able to 
measure damages on a class-wide basis using common 
proof . . . through means amenable to the class action 
mechanism.  We are looking here not for hard factual 
proof, but for a more thorough explanation of how the 
pivotal evidence behind plaintiff’s theory can be es-
tablished.48   
The question for the Third Circuit was whether the expert model 
“could evolve to become admissible evidence,” not whether the mod-
el was “perfect at the certification stage.”49 
Justice Scalia viewed the matter differently.  Quoting the Fed-
eral Judicial Center, Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence, ad-
dressing the same issue, Justice Scalia explained: “The first step in a 
damages study is the translation of the legal theory of the harmful 
event into an analysis of the economic impact of that event.”50  Plain-
tiffs, he concluded, did not meet that burden because their model did 
not separately measure the pricing injury caused by the sole, allowed 
antitrust theory from those disallowed.51  The issue was extensively 
discussed in Judge Jordan’s dissent from the Third Circuit majority 
opinion.52  Judge Jordan argued that for McClave’s comparison be-
tween the Philadelphia DMA and benchmark counties to be valid, the 
benchmarks needed to reflect conditions that would have prevailed in 
the DMA, but for the impact of the conduct in issue; otherwise, the 
model would be imputing damages that did not result from overbuild-
ing deterrence and were not the plausible result of the alleged 
 
47 Id. at 203. 
48 Id. at 203-04. 
49 Id. at 204 n.13. 
50 Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1435 (quoting FED. JUDICIAL CTR., REFERENCE MANUAL ON 
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 432 (3d ed. 2011)). 
51 Id. at 1434-35. 
52 Behrend, 655 F.3d at 216-17 (Jordan, J., dissenting). 
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wrong.53 
McClave, however, selected benchmark counties using 
“screens” which Judge Jordan concluded failed, because they failed 
to identify the “but for” conditions relevant to the only remaining im-
pact, i.e., deterred overbuilding, so the model was incapable of identi-
fying damages caused by that single impact.54 
Justice Scalia explained, regarding the same issue: “[I]n light 
of the model’s inability to bridge the differences between supra-
competitive prices in general and supra-competitive prices attributa-
ble to the deterrence of overbuilding, Rule 23(b)(3) cannot authorize 
treating subscribers within the Philadelphia cluster as members of a 
single class.”55 
In fact, Judge Jordan had noted that in “thirteen of the eight-
een counties in the Philadelphia DMA, Dr. McClave’s opinion [did] 
not even attempt to show that there were elevated prices resulting 
from reduced overbuilding.  In fact, he assume[d] that there was no 
such effect.”56  The model, he pointed out, assumed elevated prices 
from reduced overbuilding in five counties in which one competitor 
intended to enter.57  In the remaining thirteen, because something 
other than overbuilding was the cause of any elevated pricing, any 
damages with respect to them, could be attributable to lawful compe-
tition.58  Judge Jordan thus concluded that the Comcast plaintiffs had 
not just been unable to show damages could be proven using evi-
dence common to the class but, more fundamentally, had failed to 
show, for thirteen counties, damages could be proven by any evi-
dence, common or otherwise.59  What the McClave model showed 
was not that reduced overbuilding maintained higher prices across the 
entire Philadelphia DMA, but just in five counties within which a 
competitor planned to enter those counties.60  
Notably, the District Court and Third Circuit majority held to 
the contrary, finding that the McClave model could show class-wide 
damages by common proof because it calculated damages by com-
 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at 216-17.  See infra, Part II. 
55 Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1435. 
56 Behrend, 655 F.3d at 217 (Jordan, J., dissenting). 
57 Id.   
58 Id.   
59 Id.   
60 Id.   
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paring the actual prices to the constructed “but-for” market and dif-
ferences between the actual and but-for prices would, in their view, 
reflect anti-competitive impact.61  The model, they reasoned, was 
measuring supra-competitive prices in the allegedly affected market 
“regardless of the type[s] of anticompetitive conduct” by which they 
were actually caused.62   
Prior to Comcast, plaintiffs were not required to “tie each the-
ory of antitrust impact to an exact calculation of damages.”63  Doing 
so seems to come pretty close to requiring plaintiff to establish proof 
of loss causation at the certification stage, which requirement the 
Court has rejected.64   
B. Justice Ginsburg and the Dissent Position 
The Court’s decision was 5-4.  The dissent, penned by Justice 
Ginsburg, sharply disagreed with the Majority.  After discussing pro-
cedural issues as to why the Court should not have heard the case in 
the first place, Comcast had sought review of the question: 
“[W]hether a district court may certify a class action without resolv-
 
61 Behrend, 655 F.3d at 205 (majority opinion).  McClave screened for penetration by 
DBS at or above the national average to show penetration was constrained by Comcast’s an-
ticompetitive conduct, but, as Judge Jordan observed, the District Court found that DBS pen-
etration in the DMA was well below the national average, and had been before the class pe-
riod, and was unrelated to clustering, and based on valid business considerations.  Id. at 219 
(Jordan, J., dissenting) (citing Behrend, 264 F.R.D. at 165).  Instead of using the actual, non-
affected DBS penetration in the Philadelphia DMA, McClave used much higher national av-
erage rates, to conclude DBS penetration was not “substantially attributable to lawful com-
petition.”  Behrend, 655 F.3d at 219 (Jordan, J., dissenting).  Judge Jordan concluded the 
McClave model wrongly calculated liability for the foreclosure of DBS competitors.  Id.; see 
also Behrend, 264 F.R.D. at 182-84 (discussing methodology and concluding “McClave 
used his national average DBS penetration screen as a descriptor of typical competitive mar-
ket conditions.  The fact that DBS penetration would not have reached the level of national 
average for Comcast markets in the Philadelphia DMA does not mean that national average 
DBS penetration, combined with median Comcast share during the class period, do not 
demonstrate a typical competitive market.”).   
62 Behrend, 655 F.3d at 205 (majority opinion).  The court’s task was solely to address 
whether measurement and quantification of damages could be determined on a class-wide 
basis, not whether the methodology was “a just and reasonable inference or speculative.”  Id. 
at 206.  The attacks on the model, the District Court and Third Circuit held, were attacks on 
the merits of the methodology, as discussed in detail in Part II, but did not impeach the ulti-
mate holding that damages were capable of common proof on a class-wide basis, which 
should be the sole issue on a certification motion.  Id. at 207.   
63 Id. at 206.   
64 See Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2187 (2011) (holding 
plaintiffs need not prove loss causation at the certification stage).   
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ing ‘merits arguments’ that bear on [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 
23’s prerequisites for certification, including whether purportedly 
common issues predominate over individual ones under Rule 
23(b)(3).”65   
The Court, Justice Ginsburg explained, had “granted review 
of a different question: ‘Whether a district court may certify a class 
action without resolving whether the plaintiff class has introduced 
admissible evidence, including expert testimony, to show that the 
case is susceptible to awarding damages on a class-wide basis.’ ”66  
The reason for the reformulation was that Comcast had not objected 
to the admission of the McClave Report, waiving the argument that 
the expert report was not admissible testimony.67  Justice Scalia con-
cluded it was still possible for Comcast to argue that the evidence 
proffered by the class “failed ‘to show that the case [was] susceptible 
to [an] award[ of] damages on a class-wide basis’ ” and reformulated 
the issue.68   
Justice Ginsburg criticized the Court’s reformulation for 
“shift[ing] the focus” from the district court’s analysis, to the admis-
sibility of expert testimony, to the disadvantage of the class and the 
Court, both of which lacked the benefit of full briefing.69  She con-
cluded that “the decision should not be read to require, as a prerequi-
site to certification, that damages attributable to a classwide injury be 
measureable ‘on a class-wide basis’ ” given the Majority’s “depend-
ence on the absence of [a] contest on the matter.”70  She further stated 
her view that “[t]he Court’s ruling is good for this day and case on-
ly,” stating that the rule remains “that a class may obtain certification 
under Rule 23(b)(3) when liability questions common to the class 
predominate over damages questions unique to class members.”71   
Justice Ginsburg began her substantive analysis by noting that 
the district court’s elimination of three antitrust impact theories did 
not impeach the expert’s damage model because anti-competitive 
conduct was, in fact, reflected in the higher price for cable services.72   
 
65 Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1435-36 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).   
66 Id. at 1435. 
67 Id. at 1436.   
68 Id. at 1431 n.4 (majority opinion).   
69 Id. at 1435 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).   
70 Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1436 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).   
71 Id. at 1437.   
72 Id. at 1439.   
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She noted that Comcast, in the district court, had argued that 
“the three rejected theories, had no impact on prices,” at all.73  Based 
on Comcast’s own statements, Justice Ginsburg would have held that 
the damages that the model described would necessarily have 
stemmed exclusively from the sole surviving theory, conduct that de-
terred new entrants, including “overbuilders.”74  The Majority, she 
observed, set forth no support for its conclusion that the district 
court’s finding regarding the model’s ability to measure antitrust im-
pact was obviously erroneous.75   
What it did establish, the dissent maintained, was that alt-
hough the model did “not purport to show precisely how Comcast’s 
conduct led to higher prices in the [affected] area,” it did show “that 
Comcast’s conduct brought about higher prices.  And[, moreover,] it 
measure[d] the amount of subsequent harm,” which the Dissent 
would have held sufficient.76   
Justice Ginsburg criticized the Majority, noting that its rulings 
required it to “consider fact-based matters, namely what this econo-
metric multiple-regression model is about, what it proves, and how it 
does so,”77 issues discussed below in Part II.  Although it struck three 
of the expert theories, the District Court, nevertheless, concluded 
plaintiffs’ econometric model was capable of measuring damages on 
a class-wide basis, which, she reasoned “was not a legal conclusion 
about what the model proved[, but rather] a factual finding about how 
the model worked.”78   
Justice Scalia disagreed and, commenting on the dissent posi-
tion, made three points.79   
First, he explained, neither of the courts below actually found 
that the model established damages attributable to overbuilding 
alone.80  In contrast, Justice Ginsburg noted that because Comcast 
 
73 Id. at 1440 (citing Behrend, 264 F.R.D. at 166, 176, 180-81).   
74 Id.   
75 Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1440 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).   
76 Id. at 1441. 
77 Id. at 1439. 
78 Id. at 1440. 
79 Id. at 1433 (majority opinion). 
80 Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1433.  Judge Jordan, in dissenting from the Third Circuit opin-
ion, presented a highly detailed argument to support his conclusion that McClave’s testimo-
ny was “incapable of identifying any damages caused by reduced overbuilding in the Phila-
delphia DMA,” was inadmissible for that reason and incapable of constituting evidence of 
damages.  Behrend, 655 F.3d at 214-15 (Jordan, J., dissenting).  He noted that although 
Daubert had not been explicitly held applicable at the certification stage, the Court, in 
12
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had represented in the courts below that the dismissed theories had no 
price impact,81 the full impact the McClave Report quantified must 
have resulted from the single remaining overbuilder theory.82   
Second, Justice Scalia observed that while the data contained 
in the econometric model might be “questions of fact[,]” what the 
“data prove[s] is no more a question of fact than what our opinions 
hold.”83  The model’s multiple regression analysis, in the dissent’s 
view, however, “provide[d] evidence that Comcast’s anticompetitive 
conduct . . . caused the class to suffer injuriously higher prices,”84 
presumably because the model’s output is the result of its assessment 
of all perceived antitrust impacts.  The fact that the model “proves” 
something, in a legal sense, does not mean that what it proves cannot, 
as well, be a fact.   
Third, Justice Scalia then explained that even if a question of 
fact were involved with respect to the model, concluding that it “es-
tablished damages attributable to overbuilding alone would be ‘obvi-
ous[ly] and exceptional[ly]’ erroneous.”85  Given Comcast’s admis-
sions regarding the lack of price impact of the three rejected theories, 
the overbuilding theory appears, by default, to be the only theory ex-
plaining the price discrepancy the model measured and, so, it is diffi-
cult to see why that position would be “obviously” and “exceptional-
ly” erroneous.   
The Third Circuit had noted that the District Court had “asked 
the parties after the hearing how to interpret Dr. McClave’s damages 
model if it credited at least one, but not all” of the theories of antitrust 
impact, and the District Court determined McClave’s model would 
still be viable even if the court rejected some of the theories.86  Jus-
tice Ginsburg would have held that the district court had not abused 
its discretion in finding the expert model could properly be used to 
 
Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2553-54, expressed doubt about a district court’s conclusion to the con-
trary.  Behrend, 655 F.3d at 215 n.18 (Jordan, J., dissenting).  He noted that although Com-
cast had not used the language of Daubert or challenged admissibility in its papers, the sub-
stance of its challenge to McClave’s model was that it was irrelevant since it no longer “fit” 
the liability theory of the case once the District Court eliminated three of four theories of an-
titrust impact, rendering the surviving theory incapable of class-wide common proof, for rea-
sons he set forth.  Id. 
81 Behrend, 264 F.R.D. at 166, 176, 180-81. 
82 Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1440 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  See infra Part II. 
83 Id. at 1433 n.5 (majority opinion). 
84 Id. at 1439 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
85 Id. at 1433 n.5 (majority opinion) (alteration in original). 
86 Behrend, 655 F.3d at 202 (citing Behrend, 264 F.R.D. at 190). 
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measure class damages, and this would be true “even if the damages 
were limited to those caused by deterred overbuilding.”87  The class 
“alleged that Comcast’s anticompetitive conduct increased [its] mar-
ket share and market power by deterring potential entrants,” i.e., 
overbuilders, and likely others following their lead, from entering the 
market.88  This, the class argued, the lower courts accepted, and Jus-
tice Ginsburg would have held, “deprive[d] the market of the price 
discipline that their entry would have provided,” through the threat of 
overbuilder expansion, and/or the expansion of others (overbuilders), 
that might be led by their example.89 
The Third Circuit found that because plaintiffs had provided a 
method to measure and quantify damages on a class-wide basis, it 
was unnecessary to decide “whether the methodology [was] a just 
and reasonable inference or speculative.”90  Under that reasoning, 
Justice Scalia explained, “at the class-certification stage[, virtually] 
any method of measurement [would appear] acceptable so long as it 
can be applied [on a] classwide [basis], no matter how arbitrary the 
measurements [might] be,” which would effectively “reduce Rule 
23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement to a nullity.”91 
PART II 
Regression is a statistical methodology that can measure the 
correlation among explanatory variables by quantifying, when the 
value of one or more independent, antecedent variables changes,92 the 
degree to which the value of a dependent variable changes.  Regres-
sion analysis is widely used as a basis upon which to test hypotheses, 
sometimes referred to as causal models, by measuring the “fit” of 
such a model with the observed variation in value of the dependent 
variable.  The higher the percentage of observed variation in the val-
ue of the dependent variable that can be explained by variations in the 
independent variables, “explained variance,” the better the “fit” of the 
 
87 Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1440 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
88 Id. 
89 Id. 
90 Behrend, 655 F.3d at 206. 
91 Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1433. 
92 An antecedent variable is a variable that can help to explain the apparent relationship 
(or part of the relationship) between other variables nominally in a cause/effect relationship 
and, in regression analysis, an antecedent variable would be one that influences the inde-
pendent and dependent variables. 
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regression model as an explanatory formula. 
The McClave Report employed a multiple,93 linear,94 regres-
sion model to: 
establish a “but for” baseline – a figure that would 
show what the competitive prices would have been if 
there had been no antitrust violations.  Damages 
would then be determined by comparing to that base-
line what the actual prices were during the charged pe-
riod.  The “but for” figure was calculated, however, by 
assuming a market that contained none of the four dis-
tortions that respondents attributed to petitioners’ ac-
tions.  In other words, the model assumed the validity 
of all four theories of antitrust impact initially ad-
vanced by respondents: decreased penetration by satel-
lite providers, overbuilder deterrence, lack of bench-
mark competition, and increased bargaining power.  
At the evidentiary hearing, Dr. McClave expressly 
admitted that the model calculated damages resulting 
from the ‘alleged anticompetitive conduct as a whole’ 
and did not attribute damages to any one particular 
theory of anticompetitive impact.95 
Whether or what effect any of the three theories had on price 
would seem to be a question of loss (proximate) causation and the 
Court, in Erica P. John Fund v. Halliburton,96 held that the plaintiff 
need not prove loss causation at the certification stage.  In Comcast, 
the Court required plaintiff’s model, at the certification stage, to show 
 
93 “Multiple” refers to the use of two or more independent variables to explain the varia-
tion in the value of a dependent variable.  A variable is dependent when its value is thought 
to “depend” on the values of other variables.  A regression formula containing only one in-
dependent explanatory variable and one dependent variable, or a total of two variables, is 
referred to as a “bivariate” regression formula, or equation. 
94 “Linear” refers to a mathematical relationship of a constant nature, or ratio.  Geometri-
cally, a straight slope, such as an inclined ramp, would be considered “linear,” whereas, by 
way of contrast, more complex relationships could be considered non-linear (e.g. curvilinear, 
which would involve “curvilinear” regression).  Imagine a shotgun fired at a slanted upward 
angle to a wall.  Consider the task of drawing a straight line with a yardstick through the re-
sulting scattered “spray” pattern of individual buckshot holes so as to minimize the average 
distance from each hole to the nearest point on the yardstick.  That is the mathematical ob-
jective of linear regression.  The regression line would point back to the source of the buck-
shot, with some degree of residual error in measurement, but with high statistical confidence. 
95 Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1434. 
96 131 S. Ct. at 2187. 
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it was plausible that the alleged, actual antitrust impact was the result 
of (caused by) a violation, the effect of which must be measurable by 
evidence common to the class.97  After Comcast, in antitrust certifica-
tion motions, the Court appears to be demanding that a causal theory 
of price impact be plausibly and causally tied to a particular antitrust 
violation, by proof “common to the class,” which, if not identical to 
loss causation, sounds a lot like it.98  However, in securities class 
suits, plaintiffs need not prove loss causation at the certification 
stage; rather, they just need to provide proof of direct or indirect reli-
ance, under the fraud on the market theory and efficient market hy-
pothesis.99 
“Correlation is not causation” is a statistical truism often in-
toned in regression analysis in econometric applications of which the 
McClave report is an example.100  Regression models are often used 
to empirically verify a hypothesis, or a theoretical proposition, that a 
causal relationship exists between one or more explanatory variables 
that influence a dependent one.101 
 
97 Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1433. 
98 Id. at 1430.   
99 Id. at 1436 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  See generally Laurence A. Steckman & Robert E. 
Conner, Loss Causation Under Rule 10b-5, a Circuit-by-Circuit Analysis: When Should 
Representational Misconduct be Deemed the Cause of Legal Injury Under the Federal Secu-
rities Law?, in 1 1998 SECURITIES ARBITRATION 375 (1998) (discussing law of proxi-
mate causation under the common law and explaining how requirement of loss causation has 
been interpreted in the context of securities fraud litigation in each federal circuit). 
100 See, e.g., Pure Earth, Inc. v. Call, No. 12-2130, 2013 WL 3776218, at *5 (3d Cir. July 
19, 2013) (Sloviter, J., dissenting).  Although the fraud on the market theory and efficient 
market hypothesis upon which it is based are fundamental securities fraud class action prac-
tice, their continued viability appears to be in substantial question.  See generally Laurence 
A. Steckman, Risk Arbitrage and Insider Trading, a Functional Analysis of the Fiduciary 
Concept Under Rule 10b-5, 5 TOURO L. REV. 121, 142-53 (1988) (discussing fraud on the 
market theory and presumption of reliance under then recent authority, Basic v. Levinson, 
485 U.S. 224 (1988), but advocating alternative market impact theory of insider trading lia-
bility under functional analysis approach).  More recently, in Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Re-
tirement Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184 (2013), four Supreme Court Justices recently 
questioned both the theory and hypothesis.  Justice Ginsburg noting current economic re-
search shows market efficiency is not a “binary, yes or no question,” concluded that “differ-
ences in efficiency can exist within a single market.”  Id. at 1198 n.6.  Justice Scalia called 
Basic “arguably regrettable” authority.  Id. at 1206 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  Justice Thomas 
called the theory “questionable.”  Id. at 1208 n.4 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  Justice Alito stat-
ed that a reconsideration of the Basic reliance presumption might over-rule the theory entire-
ly.  Id. at 1204 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
101 See, e.g., Behrend, 264 F.R.D. at 182 (explaining McClave’s use of a multiple regres-
sion model).  Two variables may appear highly related based on a correlation analysis of 
empirical data, but this does not inform which variable(s) causes the other.  Indeed, a “spuri-
ous correlation” between variables occurs when there is no meaningful association between 
16
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Regression models are designed to measure the extent to 
which consequential changes in the value of dependent variables can 
be explained by changes in value of one or more antecedent varia-
bles.102  Further, regression models have an associated unexplained 
variance component which is a measure of the aggregate discrepancy 
between observed data and fitted data, as determined by the estima-
tion model.103  Unexplained variance may also result from the omis-
sion of a consequential explanatory variable(s) from the model, either 
intentionally or not, but which, if incorporated, would cause the ex-
plained variance to increase and the unexplained variance to decrease 
commensurately.104  For regression models, the higher the explained 
variance relative to the total variance (explained and unexplained), 
the stronger the effect of the identified explanatory variable(s) on the 
specified, dependent variable.105 
A properly specified regression model may yet prove ineffec-
tive if one attempts to extrapolate results or draw inferences beyond 
the implicit region of observations.106  For example, population densi-
ty was an explanatory variable McClave originally considered for in-
clusion in his regression model.107  However, on further analysis, 
McClave chose to omit population density because the Philadelphia 
DMA had a greater DMA than the benchmark data set which means 
that, had Dr. McClave included population density in his regression 
model, it would have extrapolated beyond the underlying data.108  
The District Court held McClave’s decision not to include population 
density was well supported.109 
Regression is widely regarded as better applied to test an al-
ready formulated hypothesis, or causal model.  Statistical a priori hy-
potheses and expectations, however, often invite bias and preconcep-
 
variables, despite appearance of an inherent, yet otherwise coincidental statistical relation-
ship, based on observational data.  Consequently, no cause-and-effect proposition is implied 
by the regression model, no matter how significant the resultant statistical estimates.  JOHN 
NETER ET AL., APPLIED LINEAR STATISTICAL MODELS 28-29, 36 (3d ed. 1990). 
102 NETER ET AL., supra note 101, at 26-31. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. at 87-89, 103. 
105 Id. at 225-26, 241. 
106 Id. 
107 Behrend, 264 F.3d at 202; NETER, supra note 101, at 85. 
108 Id. at 184 (providing that McClave also opined that the inclusion of population density 
in Dr. Chipty’s competing regression models violated extrapolation and the District Court 
agreed). 
109 Id. at 202. 
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tions in the specification of the regression model as well as conclu-
sions advanced, or hypotheses endorsed, based on their use.110  
Rummaging about for statistical correlations without a clear idea or 
theory as to why any should exist between selected variables is not 
likely to help establish a sound causal model – spuriously suggestive 
correlations exist everywhere, bearing no implication of causality 
with respect to anything. 
In class suits, a properly designed regression model is typical-
ly used to specify and quantify factors explaining substantive degrees 
of variation in determining damages, but conventional regression 
models frequently fall short of proving causation or that damages are 
the direct result of specified explanatory variables.  In Comcast, 
McClave’s multiple regression analysis was designed to measure the 
aggregate and inseparable effect of explanatory variables represent-
ing four theories of antitrust impact against a benchmark control 
group consisting of non-class customers located outside of the Phila-
delphia DMA.111 
According to Justice Scalia, the model was fatally mis-
specified because once three of the four asserted antitrust impacts 
were eliminated by the District Court, McClave’s regression model 
could not isolate, distinguish and quantify incremental damages 
stemming from each individual theory of harm against a common 
standard establishing class-wide evidence of damages.112  It was, in 
effect, an all-or-nothing proposition tied to four liability theories.  
The Court concluded (and McClave acknowledged) his model was 
not structured to be able to attribute damages solely to a single sur-
viving theory, i.e., that clustering had an antitrust impact on “over-
build[ing] deterrence.”113  It was not constructed in modular fashion 
so as to be survivable in the face of battle damage, e.g., the loss of 
several theories in support of liability, a design flaw in the regression 
model.114 
Judge Jordan’s dissent from the Third Circuit’s majority may 
turn out be the best guide to how expert reports, in a post-Comcast 
environment, should be prepared or defended.  The mis-specification 
 
110 Id. at 186. 
111 Behrend, 264 F.R.D. at 182; RICHARD A. DEFUSCO ET AL., QUANTITATIVE METHODS 
FOR INVESTMENT ANALYSIS 298-302 (2001). 
112 Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1434. 
113 Id. at 1434-35. 
114 Id. at 1435. 
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of McClave’s regression model with respect to its ability to singularly 
support the “overbuilding” theory of damage, was explained straight-
forwardly by Judge Jordan: 
[O]nce the antitrust impact of Comcast’s clustering – 
i.e., the reduction in overbuilding – has been identified 
and accounted for as part of an overbuilding screen, 
any market share screen applied to isolate the “but 
for” conditions that would have prevailed in the Phila-
delphia DMA should screen not just for Comcast’s 
share, but for the share of whatever incumbent would 
have been present but for the clustering.115 
Judge Jordan correctly went on to point out that: 
By calculating the appropriate market share screen us-
ing only Comcast’s average share through the Phila-
delphia DMA, Dr. McClave has ignored any market 
share that, in the “but for” hypothetical world, would 
have been maintained by an incumbent other than 
Comcast . . . .  McClave should have calculated dam-
ages by comparing Comcast’s current share to the “but 
for” share that would have been held by any incum-
bents Comcast replaced.  Because he instead effective-
ly calculated damages by comparing Comcast’s cur-
rent share to Comcast’s zero percent share prior to the 
class period, he unfairly suppressed the relevant in-
cumbent share and artificially inflated the damages 
calculation.116 
This was the fatal flaw in the McClave Report.  In statistical 
terminology, the Report mis-specified the econometric methodology 
appropriate to the causal theory of liability.  This error caused a sig-
nificant variable to be omitted from the subsequent multivariate re-
gression, compromising its survivability at the certification stage. 
McClave did not include any variable to account for any cable 
price impact in the Philadelphia DMA that could have resulted from 
 
115 Comcast, 655 F.3d at 220 (Jordan, J., dissenting).  There is no requirement that an ex-
pert proffer only a single theory of liability, nor a theory which could survive even it were 
criticized as to some component theory, hypothesis or calculation, particularly some section 
of the theory were made contingent of some particular fact-finding by the court or arbitral 
panel. 
116 Id. at 221. 
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market share established and maintained by an incumbent, which 
would have to have been conceptually, not statistically, distinguished 
from any incremental cable price attributable to Comcast’s conduct.  
This omission, at the causal modeling stage of the case, prevented 
McClave’s regression from being able to plausibly measure damage 
attributable to Comcast, specific to the class and, in particular, the 
Philadelphia DMA.  The McClave regression model, because it was 
not modular in construction, was not designed to survive “battle 
damage” during the certification, effectively a design flaw that 
proved fatal, as Judge Jordan explained: 
Because none of Dr. McClave’s screens reflect the 
conditions that would have prevailed in the Philadel-
phia DMA “but for” any reduction in overbuilding, the 
damages Dr. McClave calculated are ‘not the certain 
result of the wrong’. . . .  Accordingly, Dr. McClave’s 
opinion cannot help a jury determine damages, and so 
would be inadmissible at trial for lacking fit.117 
The regression model should have included a control variable 
to account for causal factors that implied a pre-existing price impact 
by incumbents.  Had such a variable been included, it would have en-
abled McClave’s regression model to isolate the incremental (post-
incumbent) impact on “overbuilders,” attributable to Comcast’s 
“clustering.”  This was a shortcoming of the causal model’s design, 
and it compromised methodology. 
Judge Jordan correctly pointed out problems with Dr. 
McClave’s screens,118 which, he concluded “call into question not on-
ly the amount of damages but also whether there are any means of 
proving damages at all in thirteen of the eighteen Philadelphia DMA 
counties.”119 
As he explained, if the McClave model was not a relevant 
means of calculating class-wide damages, saying the “model might 
be fixed . . . is no better than saying that Plaintiffs have made ‘a 
threshold showing’ of predominance or . . . [an] ‘intention to try the 
case in a manner that satisfies the predominance requirement.’ ”120  
Plaintiffs, however, had “the burden of establishing predominance 
 
117 Id. 
118 In statistical jargon, mis-specifications of the regression model. 
119 Comcast, 655 F.3d at 221 n.28 (Jordan, J., dissenting). 
120 Id. 
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and, until they have actually proffered a model that shows how dam-
ages can be calculated on a class-wide basis” by common proof, that 
burden was not met.121  The only evidence the class offered, he urged, 
should have been held inadmissible.122 
 Judge Jordan explained that it is not the court’s job to invite 
plaintiffs to return with a more robust methodology that might satisfy 
the demands of Rule 23 when they fail to provide a measure that lives 
up to the applicable standard.123  In this respect, Comcast is not a 
game-changing decision, but it does provide a good example of “rais-
ing the bar” as to just how rigorous judicial inquiry will be to try to 
determine what evidence of alleged antitrust impact really shows, and 
what evidence should be deemed admissible to satisfy class certifica-
tion requisites. 
Judge Jordan sharply criticized the Third Circuit majority, ob-
serving that the “Majority’s willingness to overlook the debilitating 
flaws in Dr. McClave’s model in an effort to avoid an ‘attack on the 
merits,’ is precisely the kind [of] talismanic invocation of ‘concern 
for merits-avoidance’ that Hydrogen Peroxide forbids.”124  His criti-
cism focuses on the causal hypothesis McClave’s regression model 
was designed to support, as well as its inability to measure the degree 
of price variation in the Philadelphia DMA attributable to overbuild-
ing deterrence.125  The model’s defects, he reasoned, would not per-
mit a proper imputation of an antitrust impact under the only theory 
available and, for that reason, could not properly measure the damage 
attributable to Comcast’s alleged “clustering.”126 
Jordan’s criticism is directed primarily to methodology, not 
measurement, but neither his, nor Justice Scalia’s, analyses usurp the 
trial court’s fact-finding function. 
To use an analogy, rather than allowing the trial court to con-
duct a test flight, it grounds McClave’s craft for design flaws with re-
spect to satisfying the requirement that plaintiff be able to measure 
damages on a class-wide basis, attributable to the sole surviving im-
pact theory of overbuilding deterrence, a flaw of McClave’s Report 





124 Comcast, 655 F.3d at 221 n.28 (Jordan, J., dissenting). 
125 Id. at 218. 
126 Id. 
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the way.  The defects are, in fact, problems in the report’s causal 
modeling, not its statistical analysis.  Because a critical explanatory 
variable could not be isolated by the model, it was defective. 
The requirement that plaintiff demonstrate an ability to meas-
ure class-wide damages by common proof is inherently more robust 
than just establishing that damage must exist.  The certification in-
quiry into whether Plaintiff has proffered a method for measuring 
damage on a class-wide basis entails a rigorous analysis as to whether 
such methodology is plausibly capable of quantifying the damages 
the trial court will be asked to award, if liability is proven. 
It is important to understand what damage models, post-
Comcast, might look like. 
McClave could have developed four regression models, one 
for each theory of liability, with the assumption and risk that compet-
ing theories of liability might be declared inadmissible.  Under such a 
single-theory framework, a benchmark control group would represent 
a non-class population enjoying expanded basic cable service, at a 
price unaffected by the alleged theory of anticompetitive conduct.  
For example, applicable to the overbuilding deterrence theory, 
McClave’s overbuilding model might have sought to define a 
benchmark group enjoying competitively-priced expanded basic ca-
ble service, within non-clustered markets, undeterred by overbuilders.  
Such a model would seek to measure the difference in price for ex-
panded basic cable service as a consequence of clustering and a 
dearth of overbuilders. 
McClave could also have directly modeled overbuilding fre-
quency across markets, adjusting for ordinary variables such as medi-
an income.  By seeking to directly model, specify and isolate the un-
derlying liability theory, a single-theory framework would offer a 
tractable means to model a particular theory, insofar as other theories 
are either lacking, or dismissed as lacking, substance. 
McClave’s approach might also have been overhauled to bet-
ter substantiate explanatory variables for alternate theories of liabil-
ity.  Such an approach would be more complex than a single theory 
framework and would require a stronger conviction that multiple the-
ories have substantive impact on estimated damages.  Properly speci-
fied, such a model would offer promise for developing a modular ap-
proach to modeling damages that implicitly ranks, and potentially 
adjudicates, multiple theories of liability, one or more of which might 
survive. 
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A modular damages model would control for differences be-
tween a suitable benchmark control group(s) and the affected class.  
However, it would require additional modeling effort to segment and 
attribute explanatory variables according to one or more theories of 
economic impact that fit the facts, isolating and explaining damages, 
tying them causally to one or more theories of impact, with each the-
ory mapping to one or more explanatory variables, while retaining a 
multi-regression model structure. 
Statistically, an explanatory variable(s) tied to a theory of im-
pact, has an associated and mutually exclusive coefficient of partial 
determination measuring the marginal contribution of each theory to 
the overall damages estimate.127  This allows for a ranked and modu-
lar approach to damage modeling in which one or more explanatory 
variables can be excluded, while allowing for a refreshed estimate of 
the damages in the event one or more explanatory variables are dis-
carded.  Restated, the model may still be survivable, even if one or 
more underlying theories are rejected, so long as the surviving ex-
planatory variable(s), through common evidence, are able to prove 
class-wide damages. 
Applicable to explanatory variables drawn from time series-
based data sets,128 a statistical test known as “Granger causality,” can 
be applied to ascertain whether theories related to changes over time 
in a variable, substantively cause a common impact, with measurable 
damages.129  The Granger causality test is applied to lagged values,
130
 
of the explanatory variables(s),131 and can be useful to prove or dis-
prove statistical significance about impact theories and causality 
damages.  The rejected impact theory of clustering based on DBS 
 
127 A “coefficient of partial determination” is the proportionate reduction in the explained 
variance of the dependent variable upon adding a new independent variable to a multiple re-
gression model. 
128 The phrase “series-based-data-sets” refers to data that is organized chronologically 
over a period of time at a specified frequency interval, e.g., daily or monthly. 
129 Effectively, this is an event’s “ripple effect.” 
130 A “lagged” value is one measured after the event represented by an explanatory varia-
ble has occurred.  Here, in using time-series data, rather than impact being treated as instant, 
it is treated as being evidenced after a time delay. 
131 Granger causality is a statistical hypothesis test for determining whether one time se-
ries is useful in forecasting another.  Regressions normally reflect correlations, but Granger 
argued some tests reveal something about causality.  A time series X is said to Granger-cause 
Y if it can be shown, through a series of T-tests and F-tests on lagged values of X (and with 
lagged values of Y also included), that those X values provide statistically significant infor-
mation about future values of Y. 
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foreclosure could have been reformulated as a Granger causality 
model to demonstrate a time-lagged cause and effect from Comcast 
denying access to regional sports programming to DBS competitors 
and a delayed reduction in DBS penetration rates.  Identification of 
this time-lagged cause and effect might have allowed the DBS fore-
closure theory to survive.  Notably, the District Court cited, as one 
form of inadmissible proof, that Comcast’s decision to not license 
CSB Philadelphia to DBS providers, which occurred before the class 
period, despite the potential for a lagged theory of impact, occurred 
during the class period. 
McClave’s regression model might, therefore, have been re-
cast as a modular damages model, with explanatory variables map-
ping back to each of the four original liability theories, but the task of 
identifying incremental explanatory variables for each liability theory 
could have been arduous and subject to multicollinearity,132 or inter-
action effects, similar to what McClave suspected occurred for popu-
lation density and number of households.  It might have been worth 
the effort if redundant theories could have been consolidated, or ob-
served multicollinearity among theories dealt with, before court re-
view.  When the District Court discarded three of the four theories, a 
modular damages model would have simply dropped explanatory 
variables associated with the discarded theories, streamlining the 
model, and, as such, a modular damages model could plausibly have 
survived in Comcast. 
III. CONCLUSIONS 
What characteristics should an expert report possess to opti-
mize the chance it will be deemed to show common questions pre-
dominate over individual issues?  How should defense and plaintiffs’ 
counsel approach these issues after Comcast? 
Comcast raises the bar with respect to the difficulty of satisfy-
ing the “rigorous analysis” standard attendant class certification, but 
it is no game-changing decision.  The District Court and Third Circuit 
majority, as well as Justice Ginsburg and the other Justices in dissent, 
 
132 “Multicollinearity” is a statistical phenomenon in which two or more predictor varia-
bles in a multiple regression model are highly correlated, meaning that one can be linearly 
predicted from the others with a non-trivial degree of accuracy.  Multicollinearity does not 
reduce the predictive power or reliability of the model as a whole, at least within the sample 
data themselves; it only affects calculations regarding individual predictors. 
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concluded Plaintiffs had nudged their claims across the line, from 
conceivable to plausible. 
Justice Scalia, applying settled rules, viewed the matter dif-
ferently. 
The concept of plausibility applies to both proffered liability 
theory and, also, to plaintiff’s proffered methodology to prove anti-
trust impact.  It also applies to Plaintiffs’ quantification of class-wide 
damages, by common evidence.  To survive “rigorous analysis,” 
plaintiffs will need to have analyses that tie, at least plausibly, causal 
model theories to actual damages – this is not proof of loss causation, 
but it’s pretty close. 
The take-away from Comcast is that experts, and their dam-
age models, must be prepared with survivability in mind—the as-
sumption should be that some theories of antitrust impact will not 
survive dismissal, whether as a result of a causal-modeling defect, or 
a more statistically-driven problem.  The multiple regression model 
in Comcast failed because it was not designed to survive “battle-
damage.”  It might have done so, however, if it had been of a modu-
lar design, but plaintiffs antitrust-eggs were really all in one basket. 
This never had to be the case.  The statistical tools, including 
regression techniques, already exist and can achieve the level of re-
finement required by the standard Comcast represents.  Comcast 
places attorneys, and their experts, on notice that all class litigation 
combatants, beginning at the trial court level, must rigorously critique 
and determine whether the causal arguments being proffered are 
merely conceivable, or actually plausible, and this is so, notwith-
standing that, ultimately, a trier of fact, in a later proceeding will de-
termine whether proximate causation actually exists.  The specifica-
tion of a damage model must, therefore, not merely satisfy class-wide 
applicability, but present a methodology plausibly measuring damag-
es attendant all theories of liability, in the aggregate, as well for each 
theory, individually, even, as in Comcast, where certification came 
down to a single, surviving theory. 
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